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In reality, many goods possess  a feature that makes them quite dif- 
ferent from the typical economic textbook commodities like apples 
or wheat. The characteristic we  have in mind is  durability. That is 
the good provides  a service to the consumer over a number of  pe- 
riods.  Hence as soon as the consumer  gets enough of  the service, 
wants to replace it for  superior performance  or needs liquidity to 
service more urgent  needs,  he will  tiy  to resell  the durable. This 
gives rise to transactions  in second-hand goods, or as we will call it 
a second-hand market. 
Now second-hand markets are best known in economics for their 
unexistence. In a seminal article, Akerlof  (1970) introduced the "le- 
mons" problem, showing that adverse selection in the used car mar- 
ket could lead to the collapse of  a second-hand market in cars. Yet 
many goods, also cars, trade in reality on second-hand markets. Some 
of  them  are even  in  good  shape, Kreps  (1990) refers  to them  as 
"peaches" while Bond (1982) calls them "creampuffs". Furthermore, 
the existence of  these markets has an important impact on the stra- 
tegies of  firms serving the new goods market as well as on the over- 
all performance of  the sector. Unfortunately  then only a few facts 
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what is known tends to be an erroneous popular view of  the matter. 
This article addresses three sets of  issues related to second-hand 
markets. First, the relation with  the new  goods  market  is  investi- 
gated. It is shown that the existence of  a second-hand market poses 
less problems to a seller as one might expect. On the other hand the 
particular organisation of  a second-hand market might mitigate other 
problems faced by  a new goods producer. Hence once established 
the influcnce  that  a second-hand marltet  can  exercise,  the condi- 
lions for the existence of  such a marltet are analysed  next. Here, a 
number of unresolved questions emerge. Finallj, some common mis- 
understandings about the organisation  of  second-hand rnarkets are 
cleared out. By  counterexample, it is shown that a feature common- 
ly  perceived essential to a second-hand market turns out to be obli- 
que. So the purpose hcre is to understand the organisation of  these 
markets in general by  focussing  on some of  them in particular. A 
final section presents some conclusions and directions for future re- 
search. 
11.  SECOND-HAND VIS-A-VIS NEW GOODS MARIETS 
In this section we document the impact that a second-hand market 
has on the associated new goods market. In the emblematic contri- 
butions on durable good monopoly this impact is  often overshado- 
wed by the restrictions that arise from a lack of  commitment power. 
We survey some of  these contributions and point to the rather spe- 
cial circumstances in which the existence of a second-hand market is 
indeed only of inferior importance. For the sake of simplicity and in 
order to square up with  the existing research, we  assume that the 
new goods market structure is monopoly. Also, the good doesn't  de- 
preciate and demand is  stationary.  Finally,  assume  there are only 
two periods  and there is no discounting. The durable good mono- 
polist  now faces either one of  the following two situations: consu- 
mers only need the good for one period  (resales case), or they con- 
tinue to use it for the second period  (expectations case). 
The problems for the monopolist  in  the resales case apparently 
arise from the second-hand market that emerges at the end of  the 
first period. The monopolist  faces at that point in time competition 
from his former customers who try to resell the good to the consu- 
mers who are now  in  need of  its'  service. But a closer look  at the problem shows that the second-hand market is not the cause of  the 
problem.  Rather on the contrary, the more opportunities to resell 
the higher the price first period consumers are willing to pay since 
they can resell the good  after they used it1). 
To see this, suppose the second-hand market, perhaps for rea- 
sons that will be discussed  below, cannot be organised. Hence the 
only supplier in the second period will be the monopolist who then 
is  able to collect  his monopoly profits. But  the buyers in  the first 
period knowing that no second-hand market exists will only pay for 
the use of  it during a single period. They will not include any resale 
value since they will be unable to collect it due to the absence of  a 
second-hand market. The monopolist then can sell in each period to 
consumers who value the use of  the good for only one period, just 
as if he sold non-durables. In contrast, whsn a perfect second-hand 
market exists, the first period buyers can resell and will include this 
resale value in their willingness to pay in the first period. Hence the 
monopolist collects exactly the same amount with a second-hand mar- 
ket as without one2). 
The true cause of  the durability problem is to be found with the 
monopolist himself, more precisely with his inability to commit to be 
inactive during the second period. When we argued above that with 
a  second-hand market  the first period  buyers  can  recover  half  of 
what  they  paid, we  assumed  that the stock  of  goods remains  the 
same i.e.  that the monopolist  is  not an active supplier  during the 
second period. This is of  course incredible : why would  the mono- 
polist remain inactive when he can sell ? Precisely this supply in the 
second  period  spoils  the resale  value  of  those  buying  in  the first 
period. In fact, if  the monopolist doesn't sell but only rents the good, 
he will remain inactive since he has no incentive to deteriorate the 
value of  the outstanding stock of  goods of  which he now is the ow- 
ner. Essentially  then renting internalises  the externality that arises 
from selling and by  doing so generates more profits to the mono- 
polist. 
The problem  of  having no commitment power  is more transpa- 
rent in  the expectations  case. There, one and the same consumer 
uses the good over two periods. Once the monopolist has sold to the 
consumers with a high reservation value, he again will not be able to 
remain  inactive.  He will  cut  prices  so  as  to sell to the remaining 
consumers who have a lower valuation. But the high valuation con- 
sumers who rationally  foresee the price cuts that will occur as soon as  they have bought  then will  postpone  buying,  unless  they get  a 
discount today. So the temptation  to which the monopolist will  be 
unable to resist  implies that he competes with  his future type  and 
accordingly has to reduce his price in advance. In a multiperiod set- 
ting, this of course tends to generate the Coase conjecture, see Coase 
(1972) as well as Stokey (1981) and Ausubel and Deneckere ((1987) 
and (1989)) for a penetrating analysis. 
Not  surprisingly then, it is  easy to show that whether the mono- 
polist  faces consumers who use  the good for one period  and resell 
to the next generation, or consumers who use the good for two pe- 
riods, equilibrium profits  for the monopolist  are the same. Yet  in 
proving that result  one has to assume that used  goods  are perfect 
substitutes  to the recently  produced  goods. Without  depreciation, 
this is of  course reasonable3). But it also implies that the monopo- 
list cannot use  discriminating devices to screen among consumers, 
or distinguish himself from the second-hand suppliers in any other 
way. 
Consider the resales case. Assume the monopolist can induce the 
consumers who have the highest valuation always to buy from him. 
No matter how big the price differential with the second-hand mar- 
ket is, the absence  of  commitment  will  not reduce  his profits. Al- 
though the first period consumers rationally  foresee that the resale 
price will be driven down, the monopolist  can serve everybody he 
wants in the second period. Clearly the ability to capture the highest 
valuation consumers in the second period doesn't mitigate the com- 
mitment problem but restores profits by  keeping the "good" custo- 
mers directly for the monopolist4). The collection of  the resale va- 
lue in selling to the first period buyers will yield less since they are 
stuck with the "cheap" consumers in the second period. 
This ability to capture the highest valuation consumers wouldn't 
help the monopolist in the expectations case. In this setting the hi- 
ghest valuation consumers  already have bought  in the first period, 
so a device that reserves them to the monopolist is of  not much use. 
Since the monopolist  already has sold to them, he will  face lower 
value  consumers  to whom  he  only  can  sell by  reducing  his  price. 
The expectations regarding this price evolution therefore remain in- 
tact and hence cause the same problems as before. 
Paradoxically,  an exactly opposite situation regarding the consu- 
mer types captured alleviates both the resales and expectations case. 
When consumers who have the highest valuation always buy on the resale market, again no matter the price differential that might exist 
between the resale price and what the monopolist charges, an even 
better outcome will result in both settings. First consider two subse- 
quent generations. Since the highest valuation consumers always will 
buy on the resale market, the first period buyers are not affected by 
the absence  of  commitment power  and will  take  into  account  the 
opportunity to resell at the price they paid themselves. In addition, 
the monopolist  can  make some second period  sales which further 
increase his profits. Exactly the same outcome appears in the single 
generation case. Since the low valuations  are served by  the mono- 
polist  first, the high valuations know the price will come down but 
there is no use in waiting for the price to fall since they will not be 
able to buy at that price  anyway5). 
From this  discussion  a number  of  conclusions  emerge  and it  is 
useful  at this point to recapitulate. 
-  there exists an equivalence between a durable good monopolist 
serving a single generation  of  consumers who use  the good  for 
two periods  (expectations case) and two subsequent generations 
which use the good one period  (resales case). The lack of  com- 
mitment power on behalf of the monopolist reduces his profits in 
both environments ; 
-  this equivalence only carries through for a particular form of inter- 
action between  sellers  and buyers,  i.e.  one in  which  particular 
forms of  discrimination are excluded ; 
-  some forms of  discrimination  then restore profits  in  the resale 
case but not in the expectations case, while other forms of  discri- 
mination restore profits in both cases. 
So many problems  attributed to the existence  of  a second-hand 
market are in fact different in nature, that is  they derive from the 
lack of  commitment on behalf  of  the monopolist. Yet for a durable 
good  monopolist  serving  two  subsequent  generations the second- 
hand market can mitigate these problems in an important way. First, 
in the absence of  a second-hand market the durable good monopo- 
!ist  is in exactly the same situation as one selling a non-durable and 
hence faces no particular problems. Hence it is appropriate to inves- 
tigate the existence of  a second-hand market. Second, since the parti- 
cular organisation of  a second-hand market CO-determines  the dis- 
tribution of  consumers over  suppliers and hence  the possibility to 
discriminate, it is appropriate to investigate  the particular  ol-ganisatiorz 
of  these markets. 111.  THE EXISTENCE OF A SECOND-HAND MARKET 
In a narrow way second-hand markets can be defined as institutions 
dealing with transactions in used goods. Then of course durability of 
the good is a necessary  condition for such a market to develop. In 
reality most  second-hand markets indeed will  handle  used  goods, 
but not exclusively so. In a broader definition the key concept then 
is not used goods but resales. 
Second-hand book shops also sell unused copies. These consist of 
large parties of  previously unsold  books. 
Often these goods are unsold stock from producer or retailer, ca- 
sually they  originate from  a bankruptcy.  While  in  the example of 
books the commodity involved still has a durable character, the broa- 
der approach  could  dismiss  durability as  a conditio sine qua non. 
The counterexamples being the second-hand markets for tickets to 
music concerts, sport contests a.s.0. While perishable - after the event 
has taken place they are worthless - they nevertheless are traded on 
second-hand markets which are better organised than the casual sel- 
ling of  socker tickets  at the gates of  the sportsground. 
Essential then is  some form  of  economic  depreciation  to certain 
users. This occurs : 
-  in the case a consumer after using a durable has no further need 
for it (houses after the retired move to Spain or Florida); 
- in the case a firm is stuck with a durable that doesn't  sell in his 
outlet (books); 
-  in  the case  a consumer misperceived  his needs of  a perishable 
(the socker fan after he finds out he's  unable to make it on Sa- 
turday evening); 
-  in the case maintenance costs increase (cars). 
The second-hand markets then all reallocate  assets from agents 
with low valuations to agents who value them more, see Bond (1982). 
Some markets will  perform  this reallocation  faster  and hence  are 
said to provide more liquidity, see Grossman and Miller  (1988) for 
more on this. 
The more durable a good is, the higher the possibility that it de- 
preciates economically to its current user, who then will offer it for 
a resale or the longer the lifetime of  a commodity, the more likely 
preferences will shift away from it. But on the other hand the more 
durable the good  is, the longer it will  do without maintenance.  If 
the second-hand market then reallocates used goods with high main- tenance costs  to users who have  a better maintenance technology, 
increased durability could reduce the usefullness  of  such a market. 
As argued already, the necessary condition for the existence of  a 
sccond-hand marltet then is thc decay in utility to some users. This 
conditiorl however is  only a necessary  one, it  certainly is  not suffi- 
cient. Instead of  having no further use  for a good, it could be that 
it malfunctions. The good then is of  no use to any consumer. Hence, 
getting rid of  it on the second-hand market and repurchasing it anew 
on the primaiy maritet is the solution. In the formation of  prices on 
the second-hand market, potential buycrs will take into account that 
they not only face sellers which have no more use for the good, but 
also those who own one of  unacceptable quality and try to sell it. If 
this  leads  to the objects of  higher  than  average  quality  not  being 
offered  on the marltet, the average  quality at any price will  down- 
grade, in turn ieading to further price decreases. This in  turn will 
eliminate even more sellers who truly have no use for the good any- 
more by having their goods sold to relatives and friends until finally 
the second-hand market complete collapses, see Akerlof  (1970). In 
addition to the decay  in  utility  documented  above  as  a necessary 
condit~on,  there thus cannot be  too much  adverse selection for  a 
second-hand market to exist. 
It now  is tempting but wrong  to conclude that we  have  derived 
the necessaly and sufficient conditions for the existence of  a second- 
hand market. We still have overlooked the apparently obvious con- 
dition that the producer of  the good must be willing to sell. Yet in 
view of  the entire discussion in the previous section, this is far from 
trivial. If  a durable good monopolist  has no commitment power and 
is unable to capture particular consumers, it was argued that he will 
make less profits than a non-durable good monopolist. But the du- 
rable  good  monopolist  can  easily replicate  the environment  of  an 
ordinary monopolist simply by  renting. The one period  service the 
consumer receives from renting a car to satisfy his transport needs 
has the same nondurable effect as eating food. As a matter of  fact, 
companies like  Xerox  and  IBM  initially  only  rented  their  equip- 
ment. But if  there are no sales of  new goods, there can't be sales of 
used  goods. 
In order to find necessary  and sufficient  conditions for the exis- 
tence  of  a  second-hand market,  one then  has  to explain  sirnulta- 
~zeoc~sly  the existence of sales of  new goods and resales of  used goods. 
That is the rental market has to break down as the preferred policy. The first and easy way out is to assume the monopolist has the po- 
wer to commit andlor can capture particular consumer groups. There 
is  no reason why  he would  rent in these circumstances, and hence 
the conditions of  decaying utility  and no adverse selection are ne- 
cessary and sufficient. A similar argument says he's required by  law 
to make sales in addition to renting. 
A second explanation  appeals to the capital needs that a rental 
policy imposes upon the producer. It then is said that he has to sell 
in  order to rotate his  capital. It  is  hard  to see why  this  "forced" 
sales  explanation  holds.  Presumably  specialised  financial  interme- 
diaries would enter the market and provide for the liquidity needed 
by  the monopolist while he retains ownership of  the good. The pro- 
fits made in  excess of  selling by  such a  "leasing"  agreement then 
can be split between the monopolist and the leasing company. As a 
matter of  fact, in many sectors leasing companies own a substantial 
fraction of  the outstanding stock of  capital goods. Hence one cause 
for the (profitable) existence of these companies, tax motives of course 
being  another. 
A third explanation calls upon the caretaking of  individuals in the 
presence  of  asymmetric information.  Ownership  of  the good  then 
induces the user to be more careful, see Milgrom and Roberts (1991). 
A driver who rents a car will be more reckless compared to one who 
owns it, since his behavior harms an owner who cannot immediately 
detect the damage. Again  this explanation  is  not  entirely satisfac- 
tory,  especially in jointly  explaining  the existence  of  sales of  both 
new  and used  goods.  Clearly,  if  a specialised  agent (car manufac- 
turer or dealer) has a hard time to figure out who drives carefully 
and who not, then a non-specialised agent (the second-hand buyer) 
will  face even more problems  to detect  "lemons". The asymmetric 
information creating moral hazard problems to the new goods pro- 
ducer then creates even more adverse selection problems to the se- 
cond-hand market".  It then is not clear whether asymmetric infor- 
mation helps in explaining the existence or the absence of  a second- 
hand market. 
So, except for the first rrexogeneousrr  explanation, it is not easy to 
explain the CO-existence  of  new-goods and second-hand markets and 
hence to derive necessaiy and sufficient conditions for the existence 
of  the latter. Further research into this area is needed, especially in 
view of  the organisational  implications that often follow from exis- tence conditions. Only a few facts regarding the organisation of  the 
second-hand market are known. We discuss them next. 
1%'. THE ORGANISATION OF SECOND-HAND MARKETS 
A common misunderstanding  about the second-hand market is  that 
it  consists  of  many  small-scale  suppliers  (ragmen). Often the con- 
centration of  second-hand bookshops is much higher than the con- 
centration in the new books market. There are a few rather exclu- 
sive Mercedes-Benz second-hand garages exceeded in number by the 
primary dealers in a country. Of  course, to these few second-hand 
"specialists" one has to add the official dealers that also sell second- 
hand  cars  as well  as  the individuals  who  sell their  used  car. The 
latter only account  for fourty percent  of  the second-hand transac- 
tions. So again it  is  difficult to say  a  priori which  market is more 
concentrated. If  one assumes that not the dealers but the manufac- 
turer is the relevant supplier of  new goods, then of  course the new 
goods market has stronger concentration. In aviation, there are only 
fifteen second-hand dealers on the entire European market, but there 
are very few constructors  of  new planes too. In any event, concen- 
tration is not a phenomenon limited to new goods markets and one 
must ask what factors determine concentration in the second-hand 
market. 
In principle, the second-hand market is as fragmented as the num- 
ber of  individual consumers the primary suppliers have sold to. There- 
fore one has to look for scale economies in one or more of  the fol- 
lowing activities : 
- searching for owners who have no further use for a good ; 
- screening the "lemons" from the "peaches"; 
- collecting the used goods. 
In addition many goods need some form of  recycling before they 
can be resold.  The recycling technologies then might  exhibit scale 
economies as well. 
Furthermore barriers to entry may prevent the emergence of  many 
organised suppliers in the second-hand market. These entry barriers 
will be important when : 
- special skills are needed to find out the quality of  the goods offered 
on the second-hand market, for example to find out in which state 
an aeroplane sold by  an aviation company is in or when the good 
becomes  "antique"; - capital requirements  are high, for  example when  "old-timers" 01- 
ancient art are involved. 
These scale  economies  in  and barriers  to  entry to  the second- 
hand  market  have  important  implications for  the new  good  sup- 
pliers. As pointed out in  the second scction, once the second-hand 
market is in place, thesc suppliers m7ill  face competition  and hencc 
it becomes important to know whether the competition is  against a 
"competitive fringe of  previous customers" or a well organised mo- 
nopolist  recyclor. 
In  addition, who selves whom? Are the consumers with the hi- 
ghest willingness to pay  served by  the supply on the second-hand 
market or conversely, are the consumers with a high valuation ser- 
ved by  the monopolist ? Again the answer will depend on the parti- 
cular market or even market segment studied7). Presumably in cars 
the high valuation consumers demand from the monopolist, yet the 
very expensive "old-timers" are to be found on the second-hand mar- 
ket. The same holds for ancient art works  (by definition since the 
painter  died), and for some clothes (for example unique pieces  of 
designer  clothes from Dior). For clothing in  general however,  the 
brand name manufacturers serve the high valuation consumers with 
only the poorer entering second-hand shops. Finally in some cases 
the quality of  the recycled  material (for example metal) is  inferior 
and cannot be used for specific purposes. Here, a careful systematic 
investigation of  particular second-hand markets would be welcome, 
especially in view  of  the importance of  this  issue,  see section two 
above. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND TOPICS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
While environmental problems  have become  a key issue in econo- 
mic life, we know only a few things on the performance of  markets 
which trade goods that exceed their users in durability or enduran- 
ce. Understanding how the market place copes with goods for which 
some consumers have no further use also is essential for understan- 
ding the durability choices made by  producers8). In daily life, go- 
vernment policies  impose new  standards on emission, recyclability 
a.s.0. These regulations  clearly  affect  the resale value of  the out- 
standing stock of  consumer goods. How does this interfere with the 
choices manufactures  make ?  I-low  do the expectations  consumers have regarding further environmental regulation affect the revenues 
of  durable good manufacturers ?  - 
These are only a few questions one cannot provide an answer to 
without a thorough insight in the working of  a second-hand market. 
But if  one thing became clear in this article, it  is precisely that still 
many  questions  regarding the existence  and organisation  of  such 
second-hand markets  remain  open. In particular  the exact  nature 
and place of  asymmetric information  in explaining the existence or 
absence of  a second-hand market is a question for theoretical inves- 
tigation. Our views on the specific organisational forms that are en- 
countered in reality hopefully can be sharpened by  future empirical 
analysis. 
NOTES 
1. Liebowitz (1982) addresses a related issue. When in addition second period consumers 
can shift their demand to the first period, one can ask when it is optimal to prohibit 
second period  sales.  If  second period  sales are outlawed, some of  the second period 
consumers together with  those of  the first period  constitute first period  demand. But 
the first period  consumers will not include a resale value in their willingness  to pay. If 
second period sales are not forbidden, first period buyers take into account the resale 
opportunities. A priori, it is unclear whether forbidding second-hand sales is best for 
the supplier. 
2. Given the assumptions made in the beginning of the section, it is easy to show that the 
monopolist  collects the same with and without a second hand market. In Figure 1 be- 
low, BCA denotes the rental demand curve. This curve tells us what a particular con- 
sumer (X) wants to pay for the use of  the good during a single period (y). When there 
is  no second-hand market, the willingness to pay for the good by  consumers who only 
have use for it during one period then exactly is given by  the rental demand curve. In 
the next period, the monopolist faces a new generation with  exactly the same willing- 
ness to pay,  hence he collects  twice  the area oxCy. With  a second-hand market, the 
new generation  buys from the old generation. Hence, all consumers between 0 and X 
can add a resale value y to their willingness to pay.  The monopolist then can charge 
consumer X  a price  equal to B  = 2y.  He then collects oxDB which  is twice  the area 
oxCy, just  as with  no second-hand market present. Finally note the curve EDA. This 
cunTe  represents the vertical  sum of  two  identical rental demand curves BCA.  It ex- 
presses the willingness to pay of consumers who use the good for two periods, but also 
is  the relevant curve for the monopolist to determine his profit maximising  sales in the 
case  consumers use the good only one period  and then resell. Hence x is  the profit 
maximising  output in  each case considered. 
3. Bulow  (1982)  rationalises this outcome by  considering a world  in which  all output is 
sold to competitive leasing firms. So the monopolist determines his optimal quantity in 
the first period by  taking into account that the leasing firms rent the good again in the 
next period. The price in that period will depend on how many additional leasing firms 
will  supply the market, that is how  much  sales the monopolist will  make the second 
period. Since all consumers are served by  leasing firms, there is no distinction between 
supply from the monopolist or past consumers. 
4. Much in this vein Gaskins (1974). Swan (1980) and Suslow (1986) reach the conclusioll 
that  the "Alcoa  problem" was not  much  of  a problem  to Alcoa. The American Alu- 
minium Company faced competition from secondary aluminium which is produced from FIGURE  1 
Monopol~~  ieveilues wrtll  and  wltl~oz~t  a secolzd-llul~d  inaiket 
scrap. If  recycling  takes time and produces only  an imperfect  substitute  for primary 
aluminium high valuation  consumers  (fastly expanding quality  demanding  companies 
such as aircraft constructors) might only use the Alcoa product. On the other hand in 
four-wheel-drive tractors, Carlton reaches the conclusion  that the tremendous durabi- 
lity of  these vehicles implies that new good producers have only a ten percent market 
share, see Carlton and Perloff  (1990). 
5. Van Cayseele (1991) shows in a setting in which the monopolist has commitment po- 
wer that  the ability to serve some low valuation  consumers first  allows  the seller to 
make profits over and beyond the monopoly outcome. The best policy calls for an in- 
tertemporal price  discriminating strategy in which first  sales are made to the highest 
valuation consumers and then to the lowest valuations. Although the highest valuations 
know that prices will decline after they have bought, the probability  that they will get 
the good at a reduced price can be made low enough so as to make them buy at the 
high  price. 
6. Some markets subject to adverse selection do function. It can be shown, see De Bondt 
(1992), Kreps (1990) or Hendrikse (1993), that the higher the proportion of goods that 
malfunction and the smaller the valuation gap (the difference between what  a car is 
worth  to a buyer  and  a  seller), the problem  aggravates.  In the present context, the 
existence of  a valuation gap may arise from the decay in utility for the initial owner. In 
another context, some users are better at maintaining a car than others. The second- 
hand market then reallocates  the stock  of  assets from  individuals  with  high  inainte- 
nance costs to handymen with low costs, see Bond (1982). But again it is hard  to see 
how individual car users would have a better sewice technology than the dealer specia- 
lised in the brand. 
7. For heterogeneity between second-hand and new good supply, see Anderson and Gins- 
burgh (1989). S. There exists an  entire litel-ature on  the choice of  durability by  producers who alyays 
sell to  the same consumers. Especially the effect  of  market structure on  durabrl~ty  IS 
analysed; for a survey see Schnialensee (1979). 
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